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Abstract 
Causal Models are like Dependency Graphs and 
Belief Nets in that they provide a structure and a 
set of assumptions from which a joint 
distribution can, in principle, be computed. 
Unlike Dependency Graphs, Causal Models are 
models of hierarchical and/or parallel processes, 
rather than models of distributions (partially) 
known to a model builder through some sort of 
gestalt. As such, Causal Models are more 
modular, easier to build, more intuitive, and 
easier to understand than Dependency Graph 
Models. Causal Models are formally defined and 
Dependency Graph Models are shown to be a 
special case of, them. Algorithms supporting 
inference are presented. Parsimonious methods 
for eliciting dependent probabilities are 
presented. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Causal Models are a new knowledge representation 
related to Dependency Graphs, Belief Nets and Bayes 
Nets. Causal Models facilitate knowledge acquisition for 
Bayesian reasoning without relying on assumptions of 
independent effects or disjoint causes. Causal Models, 
like Dependency Graphs (Pearl 1988), are graph models, 
but have edges with quite different semantics. Causal 
Models rely on assumptions about a domain rather than 
on assumptions about a distribution. Causal Models are 
related to Probabilistic Similarity Networks (Heckerman 
91) in that they allow experts to modularize their 
knowledge, though in a substantially different way than 
do Similarity Networks. 
Causal Model are appropriate for domains in which many 
modeled events can be conceptualized as processes 
causing other events which in turn trigger other 
processes. Military Indications and Warning (I& W) and 
sensor fusion are examples of two domains having such 
characteristic and have motivated this work. Many 
domains in which diagnosis is important may also be 
appropriate for Causal Models, e.g. in medicine diseases 
can often viewed as a processes. 
2 INFORMAL RELATION TO D-GRAPHS 
In a Causal Model, a directed edge strictly means that the 
event at the tail of the edge causes the event at the head. 
In a Dependency-Graph (D-Graph), absence of a directed 
edge means that certain conditional independence 
assumptions are assumed true. Thus in a Causal Model an 
edge is an assertion about a domain. In a D-Graph, an 
edge is an assertion about a distribution (Pearl 1988). 
Pearl has suggested that in many domain/distribution 
pairs, conditional independence can be inferred from the 
lack of causal links. Our work in I& W and sensor fusion 
has shown such an inference cannot be made unless 
events unnatural to the domain experts are inserted into 
the model. 
a) Traditional 0-Graph Focus 
b) Additional Causal Model Focus 
Figure 1: Foci for Elicitation 
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In addition to different edge semantics, Causal Models 
allow experts to provide more and different kinds of 
probability information. For example, assume that a D­
Graph has been constructed in which the edges can be 
interpreted as a cause effect relation. The probabilities 
provided by a domain expert for this model are the 
probabilities that various combinations of events pointing 
to a particular focus event will cause it. This is illustrated 
in Figure l{a). 
In Causal Models, however, not only can an expert 
provide the type of probabilities suggested by Figure l{a), 
but he can also provide probabilities of the type suggested 
by Figure l{b). These are the probabilities that the focus 
event will cause various combinations of the events to 
which it points. Thus in Causal Models, the expert 
provides not only the probabilities that an event will be 
caused by certain sets of events but also the probabilities 
that it will, in tum, cause other sets of events. We will 
show that by allowing both types of probabilities, Causal 
Models become extremely modular, and provide a clear 
semantic basis for knowledge elicitation. 
In the next section we will motivate and formally define 
Causal Models. We will also show that every D-Graph 
model has an equivalent Causal Model. We will present 
infereQce algorithms for Causal Models and algorithms 
which substantially reduce the effort required for 
probability elicitation. 
3 CAUSAL MODELS 
Causal Models have been motivated by experience with 
Dependency Graphs. The core of the motivating 
experience can be understood in reference to Figure l(a). 
Imagine eliciting the probability that C1 alone will cause 
the Focus Event. If event C1 is some sort of 'process', the 
elicited probability may seem to have two components. 
The first component is the probability the proc(;{ss will 
generate some sort of effect which has the potential of 
triggering the focus event. The second component is the 
probability that this potential triggering event will actually 
cause the focus event. In the mind of the expert, such a 
model is better expressed as in Figure 2(a). In this figure, 
C1 has become a focus event of the type shown in Figure 
I(b). In such cases there are often other internal effects of 
C1 as suggested in Figure 2(b). Moreover, important 
correlations often exist among these Ei caused by the Ci. 
In D-Graphs, such a correlation would be shown by an 
edge connecting the Ei . Causal Models do not show this 
correlation as an edge from one Ei to another because 
such a correlation is not a causal relation. Causal Models 
represent this correlation information in the probability 
distribution which relates a cause to its direct effects. 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 2: Causal Models 
Because conditional correlations need not be inferable 
from edges, the graph semantics of causal models are 
substantially different than those of D-Graphs. In the 
causal model of Figure 2(b) we need not assume that E2 
is conditionally independent of E3, given C1. In a Causal 
Model an edge strictly means 'causes'; it does not directly 
relate to assertions of conditional independence. 
The partial model in Figure 3 is an example of the model 
type shown in Figure 2(b). The focus events are shown by 
bold ovals. This sub-model is part of an Indications and 
Warnings system intended to 'diagnose' enemy intentions 
regarding air power. The model would be used to help 
infer the possible implications of observing an abnormally 
high number of takeoff and landings at a particular 
airfield 1. Possible explanations of the high number of 
takeoffs are movement of supplies to the base (logistics 
movement), dispersal of fighter units to the base, or both. 
Whether one or both of these processes is in operation is 
key to understanding the enemy's larger intentions. 
1 
Even in reall&W systems, such obsetvational events are binary: either 
abnormally high or not. 
ECCM activities 
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We will now provide the 
formal definition of a 
causal model, and show 
that D-Graphs can be 
considered a special case 
of Causal Models. 
3.1  FORMAL 
.------�EFINITION 
sensor condition 
The graph of a Causal 
Model consists of nodes 
corresponding to two 
different types of events: 
process events and simple 
events .  These are 
connected by edges 
Figure 3: I&W Causal Fragment meaning 'causes'. in to 
Notice that either logistics movement or fighter dispersal, 
by themselves, can cause an abnormal number of takeoff 
and landings. If logistics movement is an active process, 
abnormal numbers of takeoffs and landings are likely to 
be correlated with increased message traffic on the 
logistics command nets. However, as part of a deception 
plan, only one or none of these effects may actually 
happen. Similar remarks apply to fighter dispersal and 
tactical command net traffic. In this example, it is 
reasonable to assume that logistics movement and fighter 
dispersal are causally independent causes (Heckerman 91) 
(Pearl 88) of the abnormal number of takeoffs and 
landings (also see below).The single arrowhead implies 
that causal independence is a reasonable assumption. 
However, it is not reasonable to assume that this abnormal 
number is conditionally independent of increased logistic 
command net traffic, given that the logistics movement 
process is underway. If Figure 3 were a Dependency 
Graph, this conditional dependence would be represented 
by an edge between the net traffic and takeoff/landings 
events. We shall show in the next section however that 
this approach, though known to facilitate computation, 
makes knowledge elicitation and model building more 
difficult. 
In the example in Figure 3, the diagram is intended to 
indicate that the three causes of a sensor report of the 
abnormal count should not be regarded as casually 
independent. This is indicated by the double headed 
arrows. The Electronic Counter Counter Measures 
(ECCM) activities can prevent correct operation of the 
sensor as well as produce false alarms. The sensor 
condition can radically change the missed detection and 
false alarm rates of the sensor2. Thus the 'sensor' node is 
like a traditional D-Graph node of the type shown in 
Figure l(a). 
2 The probability of the ECCM process being active and �e probability 
of the various states of the sensor are presumably determmed by other 
parts of the model not shown. 
different ways. Without loss of generality, process events 
have only simple events for direct causes and direct 
effects. Simple events have only process events for direct 
causes and effects. All causes of simple events are 
assumed to act in a causally independent manner. In the 
model shown in Figure 3, the event node "abnormal 
number of takeoff and landings" is a simple event. The 
event node "Sensor reports high T/L count" is a process 
event. 
Associated with each process node are two sets of 
probabilities, an 'effectual' set and a 'causal' set. The 
effectual set is the same distribution normally associated 
with an event node in a Dependency Graph, i.e., the 
probabilities that the (process) event will occur given the 
various possible combinations of its causes. As with 
Dependency Graphs, these conditional probabilities can 
be recovered from any overall distribution consistent with 
the Causal Model. The causal set is the probability that 
the process event will cause through its own 'actions' 
various combinations of its (simple) effects. There is no 
corresponding information in a D-Graph. Moreover, this 
distribution is not, in general, recoverable from any 
overall distribution consistent with the causal model. 
Formally, a Causal Model, CM, is a four-tuple, 
(P, S, C, E). P is a set of nodes containing process 
events; S is a set of simple events. C is a set of edges, 
each of which leads from a process node to a simple node, 
i.e. C c P xS;;E is a set of edges, each of which leads 
from a simple event to a process event, i.e., E c S xP. 
The sets, C and E , taken together must not produce 
cycles in the model, i.e.,. the model with all its edges 
must be acyclic. A process is said to cause the set of 
simple events to which it is connected by elements of C. 
A process event is also said to be an effect of the simple 
events to which it is connected by elements of E, or 
equivalently is said to be triggered by the this set of 
events. 
Two sets of probabilities are associated with each process 
event, its effe ctual probabilities and its c a u s a l  
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probabilities. The effectual probabilities are the 
probabilities normally associated with an event in 
Dependency Graph model. If the set c* is defined as 
c*(p) = {c I <c, p> e E} (1) 
i.e., the set of simple events of which p is an effect, then 
the effectuals are the set of probabilities 
Pr(p) = {pr(p I !'C) I c c c*(p )} (2) 
where I'C denotes the event which is the intersection of 
all the events in c. 
The causal probabilities are defined similarly but will 
eventually be seen to have a rather peculiar meaning. If 
the set c� is defined as 
c®(p) = { c I <p, c > e C} 
then the causal probabilities of p are the set 
(3) 
Pr (p) = {pr(c I p) 1 c c c®(p)} (4) 
In equation (4) the probabilities are denoted by 'pr' 
because, as will become clear, they are of a different type 
than the probabilities denoted by 'pr' in equation (2). 
The probabilities in the set Pr{p) are interpreted as in a 
regular Dependency Graph, i.e., 
pr(p) = L - 11e1 pr{p 1 c) pr(c) (S) 
i'g.(p) 
where pr(c) is the marginal probability that all the 
events in c occur. 
However, the probabilities in the set Pr(p) are interpreted 
as causally independent causes of sets of simple events. 
Let s b e  a s i m p l e  event  a n d  
A(s) ={a I (a, s)e C} b e  the set o f  direct 
ancestors of s, that is the set of direct causes of s. If 
exactly the events in some subset of A(s) , A , have 
occurred then, under the assumption of causal 
independence, 
pr (s I A)= 1.0- [ II,. (1- pr(s /a))] (6) 
aeA 
Equation (6) is based on the assumption that each element 
of A{s) is capable, by itself, of causing s. Thus if s does 
not occur, each cause must have independently {the 
product term) failed to have caused it. The probability, 
pr(s /a), is the probability that s is caused by a. It is not 
the probability that s occurs given a unless all the 
causes of s are disjoint. This is the difference between the 
probability types (2) and (4). 
Figure 4: Co-occurring Events 
If the probability of more than one event is to be 
calculated, application of the concept behind (6) becomes 
more complex. Consider computing the probability, 
pr(axy), from the model fragment shown in Figure 4. 
Assume that the figure shows all the causes of the simple 
events, x andy . We see from the figure that a can cause 
both x and y, but b can cause only y . The required 
probability under the assumptions of causal independence 
can be computed as 
pr(axy) 
= {1 .0 - [(1 - pr(x y I a)X1 - pr(x Y I a) pr( yl b))]} pr(a b) (7) 
+ {1 .0- [ (1 - pr(x y I a))D pr{a h) 
Equation (7) can be understood as follows: if a and b 
both occur, then x and y will not occur together only if a 
fails to cause them both and a also fails to cause just x 
while b fails to cause y; if only a occurs, then it must 
have failed to cause the pair. Note that from {7) 
pr(ax I y) = pr(x y I a) if and only if pr(a b)= 0. An 
efficient algorithm for computing the general case is given 
below. However, it is based on indirect methods which 
provide little insight into the semantics of causal 
independence. 
3.1.1 D-Graphs Are a Special Case 
A simple construction exists which will convert a 
Dependency Graph Model into a Causal Model. 
[1] Consider all events in the Dependency Graph Model 
to be process events and place them in the set P. 
[2] For each edge, (Pi• Pj) , in the Dependency Model, 
create a simple event, si.j and place it in the set, S. 
Also create an edge (Pi• si.j)• place it in the set C; 
create an edge (si.j• Pj) and place it in the set E. 
[3] For all Pi e P set all elements of the set Pr(pJ 
equal to 1 .  
This algorithm just inserts a unique simple event into each 
edge of a Dependency Graph. Since this event has a single 
ancestor and its probability of occurrence given the 
ancestor is unity, the probability of the original process 
nodes, conditioned on their ancestors, remains 
unchanged. 
3.2 KNOWLEDGE ENGINEERING 
The major value of Causal Modeling is the support which 
it provides for the knowledge engineering process. Causal 
Models have a theoretical basis allowing them to be built 
in a principled way from modular chunks of knowledge. 
We do not claim that Causal Models are universally 
applicable to all problems to which D-Graphs are 
applicable. But we do claim that in domains in which 
activation of processes are important events, Causal 
Models can greatly improve the knowledge engineering 
process. 
To see how Causal Models provide principled support for 
modularity and hence for multiple experts begin by 
considering the Dependency Graph of Figure 5(a) (for the 
moment, without the dashed edge). Because it is a D­
Graph, a, b, c, and d are all to be taken as process events. 
Interpretation of Figure 5(a) as a Dependency Graph 
implies that e and d are conditionally independent given 
a. Suppose however that this independence assumption is 
inappropriate. This lack of conditional independence can 
be expressed by adding and edge connecting c and d as 
shown by the dashed edge in Figure S(a). 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 5: Correlated Effects 
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It may not be clear in which direction the new edge 
should point. The correlation implies neither that c causes 
d nor that d causes c. 
The direction assigned the edge will have significant 
impact on attempts at modular probability elicitation. 
Suppose that we have different experts for processes c 
and d. If we direct the edge from c to d, the expert in d 
will need to provide probability estimates for c being 
involved in the triggering of d, probabilities of the form 
pr ( d I a 6 c )3. The d expert will probably respond that 
c has no effect on d. Similar remarks would apply when 
the direction is from d to c. 
It is most likely that it is the expert in process a who 
would feel that e and d are probably correlated given 
that process a is active. This situation is better described 
by the Causal Model shown in Figure 5(b). In Figure 5(b) 
simple events x and y, most likely events within process 
a, have been identified as the more specific causes of c 
and d. The correlation has been associated with these 
events4. The result is that the expert in process a can 
focus on how simple events x and y are correlated 
within process a, and the experts in processes c and d 
can focus on how their processes respond to these simple 
events if and when they occur. 
When the basic domain knowledge has characteristics 
appropriate for a Causal Model, re-representing this 
knowledge as a Dependency Graph can require significant 
transformation of the basic knowledge. The expert is 
usually required to make such complex transformations 
mentally. As an example of the complexity, we will show 
how to compute the probability pr (d /abc) from the 
parameters of the Causal Model in Figure 5(b). This 
probability is required by the D-Graph in Figure 5(a) if 
the dashed edge points from c to d. Its value is given by 
pr (d /abc)= pr (abed) I pr (abc). We will compute 
each of the right hand factors separately. 
The assumptions and structure of the model in Figure 5(b) 
require that x occur if c is to occur, and either x or y or 
both to occur if d is to occur. Thus 
pr ( abxyzcd) 1 
pr (abed)= + pr (abxyicd) pr (ab) 
+ pr (abxyzcd) 
The model further implies 
(8) 
3 Where the dot indicates either the event or the complement of the event 
can appear. 
4Process a might be thought of as some sort of control process, and the 
simple events as the 'signals' which are sent to the processes c and d. 
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pr (abxyzcd) = pr (xy /a) x pr (z !b) 
x pr (c /x) x pr (d /y z) x pr (a) 
pr (abxyicd) = pr (,zy /a) x pr (i /b) 
x pr (c /x) x pr (d /y i) x pr (ab) 
pr (abxyzcd) = pr (xy /a) x pr (z /b) 
x pr (c /x) x pr (d /y z) x pr (ab) 
Likewise 
pr (abc)= pr (abxc) 
(9) = pr (c /x) pr (x /a) pr (ab) 
We can now defend our claim that knowledge 
engineering is more modular for Causal Models than for 
Dependency Graphs. Causal Models are modular because 
the probabilities associated with Figure 5 (b} can be 
estimated by multiple domain experts each concentrating 
on a single process node. It is even possible to use two 
experts on each node, one who understands how the 
process generates effects and the other who understands 
how the process is triggered. By contrast an expert 
providing the probability, pr (d /abc) , must, as we have 
just demonstrated, have knowledge of multiple nodes. 
We claim superior support for Knowledge Engineering 
for any case where the actual domain knowledge fits the 
template implied by Figure 5(b). The essence of this fit is 
that knowledge of the domain consists of the (stochastic) 
understanding of processes, how processes cause simple 
events, and how simple events trigger processes. 
Dependency Graphs, on the other hand, assume the 
relevant knowledge is concentrated only in knowledge of 
process triggering. In domains we have investigated 
(military I&W and sensor fusion), the additional 
knowledge about how processes cause simple events 
(usually with correlation ) is a key part of the domain 
information. 
3.3 ALGORITHMS 
To make Causal Models practical, two classes of 
algorithms are required, algorithms for inference, and 
algorithms for elicitation. The inference algorithms must 
convert a Causal Model into a probability distribution or a 
family of marginals of such a distribution, so that 
Bayesian inference can be performed (in any of a number 
of standard ways). The elicitation algorithms must make 
probability elicitation practically feasible. 
3.3.1 Inference 
The following algorithm computes the joint distribution 
over all events in the model. It is clearly not feasible in 
this form except for small problems. The major reason for 
presenting the algorithm in this form is to present a 
systematic method for performing in a general way the 
computations analogous to those in equations (8) through 
(9). The description of the algorithm assumes that all 
events are binary. This is without loss of generality, 
however, because appropriate specification of the causal 
and effectual probabilities allows events to be declared 
disjoint. Disjoint events can be interpreted as discrete 
instances of some particular variable. 
Assume that the Causal Model has a single uncaused 
process event, n, which occurs with probability oneS. 
Further, assume that the graph is structured so that (1) n 
is a process event, (2) process events point only to simple 
events, and (3) simple events point only to process 
events6. Since the graph is acyclic, we can define the 
'level' of any node in the graph as the length of the longest 
path from n to that node. Define the depth, D. of a 
graph to be the level of the deepest node. Let E be the 
set of all events in the model, E = S u P , and let the set 
JD(M) = {jd(j) I j c E} 
be a set of probabilities defined over the power set of all 
events in the model. If jd(j ) is interpreted as the 
probability that all the events in j occur while all the 
events in (E - j ) do not, then JD(M ) is a joint 
distribution over all the events in the model. Given these 
definitions, the following algorithm computes the joint 
distribution implied by a Causal Model: 
[l](lnitialize; set priors for all combinations of all events 
caused by !1.) Set all jd(.) e JD(M) to zero. LetK 7 
be the set of direct effects of Q. For all k c K , set 
jd(k) =pr(k), pr(k)e Pr{.O) . Set the current value of 
'level' to 1. 
[2]While 'level' is less than D, the model depth, repeat 
Steps [2.1] and [2.2], 
[2.1](Determine the joint probability of the process 
events at the current level co-occurring with 
other process events at this level and all events 
at shallower levels.) For each process node, p at 
the current level, let K be the set of direct causes 
of event p . For each j, j c E set 
jd(j u {p}) equal to jd(j)*pr (p I j (1 K), 
pr (p I j (1 K) e Pr(p); then  subtract  
jd(j U {p}) from jdG ). 
[2.2](Determine the joint probability of the simple 
events at the next level co-occurring with other 
simple events at that level and with events at all 
previous levels.) For all j, j c E , set jd'U ) 
equal to 0. For each process node, p, at the 
5 n provides an easy way for specifying correlations among the 
'uncaused' events in the model. 
6 This is again without loss of generality because dummy events and 
unitary probabilities can be insened to trivially satisfy these conditions. 
7 The set, K, can be thought of as the set of simple events which are 
'uncaused' within the model. 
current level, let K be the set of direct effects of 
event p. For each j, j c E , and for each 
k c K s e t  jd'(juk)e q u a l  t o  
jd(j)*pr{k I p) , pr{k I p )e Pr{p ). For all j, 
j c E set jd(j) equal to jd'(j). Increment the 
level by 1. 
3.3.2 Complexity 
This algorithm is clearly exponential in the number of 
events in the model (nodes in the graph). Step [2.2] 
eliminates any hope of using the graph structure to infer 
conditional independence. Indeed much of the motivation 
for this work was to capture dependencies among effects 
given the operation of various causal processes. Thus it is 
the nature of the knowledge we wish to model which has 
caused us to forego the convenience of triangulating the 
model into manageable cliques! 
In general, stochastic sampling is probably required to 
make Causal Models feasible. However, some of the 
exponentiality of the algorithm can be tamed with two 
tricks. The first trick is to compute only over relevant 
portions of the model. The second trick is to integrate 
events out of the joint distribution when they no longer 
impact further computation. The only relevant portion of 
the model is the subgraph which includes the 
observations, causes of interest, D, and their 
interconnections. Focusing only on this part of the model 
can greatly reduce, in any particular case, the size of the 
graph which must be considered. Computations ?f the 
joint distribution are impacted only by events wh1�h do 
not as yet have all of their directly connected effects m the 
distribution. Thus, if an event is neither an observation 
nor a cause of interest, it can be integrated from the joint 
distribution once all its effects are in the joint distribution. 
This means that at the end of each iteration of step [2), 
some events can be eliminated from the (growing) joint 
distribution. 
3.4 ELI CITATION 
A Causal Model requires,elicitation of both effectual and 
causal probabilities. Effectual probabilities are exac
_
tly 
the same probabilities which normally parametenze 
D-Graphs. An effectual probability is the probability that 
a particular event will occur if some particular 
combination of its direct potential causes occurs. A causal 
probability is the probability that a particular event will 
causeS a particular combination of its potential direct 
effects. The cardinality of the sets is exponential in both 
cases. 
Experience has shown that experts do not like to provide 
the large number of parameters required to fully speci�y 
Causal and Effectual Probabilities. In D-Graphs, th1s 
exponential explosion for effectual probabilities is usually 
8 Not co-occur with! 
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avoided by assuming causes to be either disjoint, or 
causally independent. 
A problem introduced by Causal Models is that the very 
reason for their existence, to deal with non-disjoint causes 
and correlations among effects, makes use of the above 
assumptions self defeating. and elicitation of the 
probabilities required by the model difficult. Moreover, 
elicitation of causal probabilities is intrinsically more 
difficult than effectuals. Each element in a set of 
effectuals can take on any value in the closed interval 
[0,1]; in contrast, the sum of the elements in a set of 
causal probabilities must be equal to exactly one. For 
causal probabilities, the additivity axiom raises its ugly 
head9. We have developed methods to reduce these 
difficulties. 
We have developed new methods, both for Causal and 
Effectual probabilities, to elicit reduced numbers of 
parameters, and to default the rest. The methods manage 
to achieve this without wholesale assumptions of either 
causal or probabilistic independence, and without 
assumptions of disjointedness. 
3.4.1 Causal Probabilities 
A major purpose of causal distributions in Causal Models 
is to model interactions among effects. Therefore 
elicitations based on (10) have little utility10. 
pr (d, t, b, a, ) 
= pr (d) pr (c) pr (b) pr (a) (10) 
Modeling a causal distribution as a Markov process does 
allow a distribution to be inferred from the specification 
of the interactions among a few events. For example, 
using 
pr(d,t,b,a,)= 
pr (d /c) pr (t /b) pr (b ia) pr (a) (11) 
allows the full distribution to be estimated from seven 
parameters11. In addition, each of these parameters may 
take on any value in the range [0, 1], regardless of the 
value of the other parameters. But such models often do 
not correspond to the marginals with which domain 
experts feel most comfortable. For example, if pr(a ) is 
used directly in (11), pr(b) cannot be used unless a and 
b are independent. 
9 We could proceed at this point to (re)invent Possibility Theory, but we 
will not! 
10 The dots indicate that the variable may stand for either an event or 
tits complement. 
11 E.g. 
pr (a), pr (b /a), pr (b /a), pr {c /b), pr {c /6), pr (d/c), pr (d /c) 
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Our elicitation technique for causal distributions is based 
on eliciting sequences of marginal probabilities such as 
pr (a), pr (b ), pr (ba), pr (c ), pr (ca), 
pr (cb), pr (cba) pr (d), pr (da ), 
pr (db), pr (dba), pr (de), pr (dea), 
pr (deb), pr (dcba) 
(12) 
These are elicited in the order shown and any value may 
be defaulted except those involving a single event12. 
Defaulting events has results related to Markov process 
models as we will show later. A difficulty is that legal 
values for any particular probability in this series are 
dependent on the probability values given earlier in the 
series. We have developed an algorithm (Lemmer 91) 
which computes the legal range for an expert before he 
provides a value. 
Sequences such as (12) allow many experts to provide 
probabilities for which they have good intuition. There are 
many other legal orderings of (12), one of which appears 
below in (13). By legal ordering we mean an elicitation 
order for which our allowable value algorithms will work 
correctly. Not only do such sequences allow all first order 
marginals to be specified, but have another interesting 
feature as well. In the sequence (12), consider the 
elicitation of pr(dba ). When the expert must provide this 
value, the values for the marginals involving all the 
subsets of { dba } have already been specified. Therefore, 
the expert can provide, pr (d /ba) , pr (b Ida) , or 
pr (da /b) , etc., whichever value he feels most 
comfortable with. Or he can default it. 
The results of defaulting values can be illustrated with the 
following sequence , a legal reordering of (12): 
pr (a), pr (b ), pr (ba), pr (c ), pr (cb), 
pr (ea), pr (eba) pr (d), pr (de ), 
pr(db),pr(deb), pr(da), pr(dea), 
pr (dba), pr (dcba) 
If only the values in the sequence 
pr (a), pr (b ), pr (ba), pr (c ), 
pr (cb), pr {d), pr (de ) 
(13) 
(14) 
are actually provided, the same distribution results which 
would result from (11). The difference is that more 
intuitive parameters may appear in (14) for many cases. 
3.4 .• 2 Effectual Probabilities 
12 Single event probabilities could be defaulted to some value such as 
0.5, but this would be essentially meaningless. 
In this section we will develop a method for estimating 
the values of the probabilities in the set, Pr(p ), defined in 
(2). The procedure will be defined in the same spirit as 
above. The intent is to allow interactions (i.e., 
correlations, dependencies, etc.) among small sets of 
events to specified in such a way that the interactions 
among larger sets can be reasonably and coherently 
defaulted. 
In a Dependency Graph, if an event is pointed to by a set 
of events which cannot be assumed disjoint, it is usually 
necessary either to specify each of the values on the set 
Pr(.) or to invoke the assumption of conditional 
independence. Equation (15) defines the meaning of 
causal independence: 
pr (xI E, E)= 1.0- n (1- pr (x /e)) (15) te!' 
If the set of events, E U E , contains all the events which 
point to x, and if the events in E have occurred and those 
in E not, then the probability of x is computed as in (15). 
We will generalize this in two ways: We will model how 
subsets of the set of events which have occurred can 
interact synergistically, and we will model the necessity 
of occurrence of subsets of the set of events which have 
not occurred. 
Synergy can be modeled by modifying (15) as shown in 
(16). Note that in (16) the product iterates over subsets of 
E rather than elements of E as in (15). The quantity sy* 
is defined in (17) so that if all the sy (not sy*) are equal 
to zero, (16) reduces to (15). The sy's are the synergy 
terms so, in this case, we say there is no synergy among 
the causes of x. 
pr (xI E, E)= 1.0- II (1 - sy* (x /e)) (16) � 
* 1 {pr (x / e) iflel= 1 sy (x e)= sy (xI e) otherwise (17) 
Equation (18) illustrates the meaning of the sy's. 
pr (x lab) 
= [1 - (1-pr (x /a)Xl-pr (x /b)X1-sy (x /ab))]
08) 
If the value of the sy term in (18) lies in the interval (0, 1], 
the probability of x is greater in (18) than it would be in 
(15). The causes, E = {a, b} interact with positive 
synergy in this case. If sy is less than 0, the probability of 
x is less than that computed from (15) and the causes 
have negative synergy. They inhibit each other to some 
extent. 
To insure that (16) computes valid conditional 
probabilities, the sy* values must lie in the ranges shown 
in (19) and (20). 
sy*(x /e) � 1.0 (19) 
00 
0.0 � II (1- sy*(x /e))� 1.0 (20) AcE ecA 
In (21) we modify (16) to model the necessity of possible 
causes which did not occur (i.e., are in the set E). Note 
that if the values of all the ne's are zero, (21) reduces to 
(16). 
pr (xI E, E)= [ 1 .0 - ]J: (1- sy* (x /e))] 
(21) 
x II (1 - ne (x /e)) eQ; 
To see the meaning of the ne's, consider (22). Assume 
that E = { c} and that ne (x /c) is equal to one. This 
means that the event, c. is absolutely necessary for x to 
occur. Equation (22) will then evaluate to zero, no matter 
what the other parameters. 
pr(x /abc) 
= [1 - (1-pr (x /a)X1-pr (x lb)X1-sy (x /ab))](22) 
x (1-ne(x I c)) 
To insure that (22) computes valid condition probabilities, 
(19), (20), (23), and (24) must be satisfied. 
ne (x /e)� 1.0 (23) 
0.0 � II (i- ne (x /e))� 1.0 (24) eQ; 
Using (22), a domain expert can avoid providing most of 
the 2IE u El parameters of Pr(.) while avoiding 
unrealistic assumptions of conditional independence. 
4 CONCLUSION 
We have presented Causal Models as a knowledge 
representation technique for domains which can be 
modeled as stochastically triggered processes which 
stochastically cause other triggers. An advantage of this 
representation is that it is modular and provides a 
principled way to combine knowledge acquired from a 
number of different experts. The representation is 
especially relevant in domains in which the various 
possible causes of particular events are not disjoint and in 
which events are not independent even when conditioned 
on their possible causes. Examples of such domains have 
been provided, and we have shown that Dependency 
Graphs are a special case of Causal Models. 
We have presented methods for reducing the number of 
parameters which an expert, not willing to assume various 
types of independence, must supply to quantify 
correlations. These methods allow correlations (non-
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independences) to be specified meaningfully with a 
parsimonious set of numbers. 
We have presented algorithms for computing the joint 
distribution implied by our knowledge representation. A 
difficulty is that, without special structure, these 
algorithms quickly become infeasible. 'Triangulation' 
algorithms for Dependency Graphs (Neapolitan 90) also 
rely on structure for computational feasibility, but their 
requirements are admittedly much less severe than the 
requirements for the algorithms presented here. 
5 FURTHER RESEARCH 
The author's experience has been that the representations 
and techniques described here facilitate the knowledge 
acquisition process and, when compared to traditional 
Dependency Graph techniques, result in better, more 
robust, more maintainable models . Empirical validation 
of the this experience would be valuable. 
More efficient algorithms to support estimation of 
(portions of) the underlying joint distribution are needed. 
Just as 'triangulation' techniques take advantage of the 
semantics of a Dependency Graph, algorithms may be 
found which take advantage of the semantics of Causal 
Models. 
References 
Heckerman, David, Probabilistic Similarity Networks, 
MIT Press, 1991. 
Lemmer, John F., SBIR Phase II: Application of Modern 
Mathematics to Theater Air Warfare Intelligence, Rome 
Laboratory Technical Report, TR 91-111, Rome 
Laboratory (IRAE: Attn: Steve Farr). 
Neapolitan, Richard E., Probabilistic Reasoning in Expert 
Systems, Wiley lnterscience, 1990. 
Pearl, Judea, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent 
Systems, Morgan Kaufmann, 1988. 
